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Water infrastructure has been owned by and governed through differing combinations of the private and 
public. In the present moment, financialisation is radically reconfiguring these arrangements, turning water 
infrastructure into a wealth extraction mechanism.  
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Abstract 
Water infrastructure has been financed by differing combinations of private and public ownership 
throughout history and across different geographies. In the present moment, processes of 
financialisation suggest a radical reconfiguration of these arrangements in a number of locations, 
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such that water infrastructure is being transformed into a wealth extraction mechanism. In this 
Primer Article, we introduce financialisation, showing how the term describes a process through 
which financial actors have gained new power and in which the locus of profit making at least 
appears to have shifted from the ‘real economy’ to a financial economy. In the case of water 
infrastructure, processes of financialisation have enabled apparently fixed and stable forms such as 
pipes, water treatment plants and sewers to be transformed into liquid assets, opening up new 
opportunities for sovereign wealth funds and pension fund investors. The super-profits made by 
these financial actors are best conceptualized as forms of rent, derived in part from the monopoly 
ownership of a basic need. This distinctive shift needs to be positioned in relation to broader 
changes in the political economy of water infrastructure. We situate financialisation historically in 
relation to the development of water utilities and networks: municipalisation and nationalization 
during the first decades of the 20
th
 century, privatisation since the 1990s, and renewed interest in 
remunicipalisation in some places alongside the deepening logic of financialisation in others. We 
conclude by thinking through the likely implication of water financialisation for future infrastructural 
arrangements. 
Keywords: finance, rent, financialisation, privatisation, infrastructure 
 
Introduction 
In a growing number of instances around the world, infrastructure is being reconfigured in ways that 
maximise wealth extraction (Hildyard, 2016). In the case of London, for example, the city’s water and 
sanitation provider has been transformed from a public utility into a private company and now, in its 
most recent form, into an investment vehicle for sovereign wealth funds in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and 
China. Simultaneously London’s water infrastructure now provides a reliable revenue stream for 
pensioners in Canada and the UK. Providing infrastructure for actual needs is becoming less relevant 
than extracting “value from illiquid assets by turning them into liquid forms” (Pryke & Allen, 2017, 
p.2). Of course, the two need not be incompatible – it could be quite possible for wealth to be 
extracted from a project that the city desperately needs (for a more optimistic take on such a 
process see Castree & Christophers, 2015) – however the growing importance of infrastructure’s 
function as a wealth extraction mechanism emphasizes the significance of a process often referred 
to as financialisation. Reflecting this significance, the literature on the financialisation of water has 
grown rapidly in recent years (Ahlers & Merme, 2016; Allen & Pryke, 2013, 2017; Bayliss, 2014, 2017; 
Bresnihan, 2016; Loftus & March, 2016, 2017; Merme et al., 2014; Schmidt & Matthews, 2018). Such 
research builds on a much larger interest in the changing dynamics of capitalist societies (Harvey, 
2010), the role of infrastructure within those changing dynamics (Graham & Marvin, 2001), and the 
spiralling profits within a financial sector that now appear to outstrip the wealth amassed in 
manufacturing, construction and the service economy (Lapavitsas, 2014). Generally associated with 
the growing power of new financial actors (Epstein, 2002), financialisation is also understood by 
some to refer to a process in which the locus of profit-making has shifted from the ‘real’ economy to 
the financial economy (Stockhammer, 2010). In what follows, we will explore what is meant by 
financialisation as well as the ways in which this process appears to influence the construction, form 
and ownership of water infrastructure.  
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WHAT DO WE MEAN BY FINANCIALISATION? 
For Christophers (2015, p.184), “if globalization was the new buzzword of the 1990s and 
neoliberalization…of the 2000s, then financialization is very much the buzzword of the 2010s”. As a 
buzzword, financialisation clearly has limits and risks describing such a broad array of changes that it 
is rendered meaningless. Christophers (ibid.), therefore emphasises the “analytic, theoretic, 
strategic, optic, and empiric” limitations. Nevertheless, for others the term has clear analytical 
purchase, referring to a distinct set of shifts that have taken place within advanced capitalist 
economies. Cutting across the two principal understandings of financialisation referred to above (as 
the growing power of financial actors and a shift in the locus of profitmaking) there is a demand for a 
conceptual framework that accounts for apparent shifts in the way in which capitalism works. Some 
conceptual clarity on what makes capitalism distinctive is therefore necessary. 
As a mode of social and economic organization capitalism is distinctive in separating the vast 
majority of the population from their means of existence. The only way of accessing necessities such 
as food, clothing, housing and water is by earning a wage and buying them as commodities. These 
commodities are produced under a distinct set of conditions in which workers freely give up their 
time and energy in return for the wage they receive. For Marx, the origin of profits lies in this 
production process. Surplus value is produced when a worker exchanges her labour power (time, 
energy and skills) for a wage while contributing a greater value to the labour process than she 
receives in return. Profits are therefore tied to the exploitation of workers under these historically 
specific conditions. In recent years serious questions have arisen over the ability of such a 
conceptual framework to adequately account for the massive profits associated with financialisation 
(Christophers, 2017). If manufacturing, construction and the service economy now account for a 
relatively small part of an economy such as London’s, how do we explain the massive profits accrued 
within the financial sector? If we transpose such a question to the water sector, it becomes one of 
whether investment funds make their (often massive) profits from the production and sale of 
potable water or from somewhere else. 
Responding to the apparently new moment of capitalist development described above, Costas 
Lapavitsas (2014) refers to financialisation as “profiting without producing”. He thereby captures the 
inherently speculative process through which profits appear divorced from the real economy. Fine 
(2013), nevertheless, points to fundamental problems in Lapavitsas’ analysis and, instead, argues 
that financialisation is defined by the growing importance of Interest Bearing Capital (IBC). In very 
simple terms Interest Bearing Capital is money that is loaned in order to make more money. The 
repayment of interest on such a loan relies on whoever borrows the money expanding value in 
production. These interest payments are therefore tied to the lender gaining a future share in 
profits. The increasing dependence on (speculated) future returns associated with the growing 
circulation of IBC leads to an expansion of what David Harvey (2006) refers to as fictitious capital: 
“money that is thrown into circulation as capital without any material basis in commodities or 
productive activity” (p.95). Fine’s analysis is helpful to a point in analysing the shifts within 
financialised water infrastructure; however, it is necessary to supplement such an analysis with an 
understanding of how monopoly ownership of water infrastructure enables financial actors to 
appropriate value in the form of rents (we expand on this significance of rents in a much longer 
paper (forthcoming)). The historical significance of this new relationship can be viewed more clearly 
when situated in relation to a periodisation of the political economy of water infrastructure. 
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HOW HAS THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURE OWNERSHIP CHANGED 
HISTORICALLY? 
Globally, the public and the private sector have tended to take more and less important roles within 
the water sector at different moments in time. These roles have shaped both the ownership of 
infrastructural networks as well as the financing of them. Drawing predominantly on the experience 
of the global North, we can highlight five main historical periods in urban water supply. In any case, 
such a typology, it should be borne in mind, is a simplification of specific historical-geographical 
processes. Experiences across the global South have been even more varied than this simple 
periodisation suggests (Bakker, 2003; Budds & McGranahan, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2004), although 
several aspects of the heuristic – the shift from predominantly publicly owned systems under 
colonial rule, to private sector involvement following the debt crises of the 1980s – suggest some 
similarities.  
1. Atomized private water suppliers in the city 
During the early 19
th
 century small private companies supplied some parts of the urban fabric 
(especially in Europe and North America), normally the richer ones, creating a social stratification of 
service provision (Swyngedouw, 2004). Encouraged sometimes by the public sector (Davis, 2005), 
the private sector, therefore, undertook a large share of the investment in the first water supply and 
sanitation networks: the cost of running the system was covered by user fees and flows of water 
were therefore directed to well-off neighborhoods as a private good, subject to the ability to pay on 
the part of the consumer (Castro, 2009). Notwithstanding some exceptions, such as the important 
case of Madrid’s (Spain) mid 19
th
 century public intervention and financing (March, 2015), Kerf 
(1998) compiles interesting examples from three different countries (France, Britain, and the United 
States) where private companies can be seen to have developed much of the early water 
infrastructure.  
2. Municipalisation trends in the early 20
th
 century 
Throughout the 19
th
 century, urban water supply networks confronted problems of quality and 
quantity regardless of the source (surface or underground). At the same time, industrialization 
pushed migratory flows towards cities, enlarging their population and consequently increasing the 
demand for water resources. During this period of rapid industrialization, pollution soared. 19
th
 
century water-borne epidemics, especially cholera, which wreaked havoc in urban Europe, 
unleashed an important debate regarding the need to generalize water supply to all the population. 
Reduced water access and sanitary concerns (water-borne diseases), combined with social unrest 
and recurrent urban fires (Gandy, 2002) triggered debates around the municipalisation of water 
services which, in many cities, resulted in the takeover of urban water services by local public sector. 
While user fees were still charged, financing was made possible through local taxation. 
3. Increasing role of the national State leading to nationalisation in many instances 
Although geographically uneven, a third stage began roughly after World War I as the water sector 
came to be viewed as a cornerstone for national growth (Swyngedouw, 2007): a wave of 
nationalizations, therefore, swept across most of the global North. Budds & McGranahan (2003) 
argue that these efforts crystallized and were institutionalized throughout the 20
th
 century leading 
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to an almost exclusively publicly owned water sector around the world. The (national) State gained 
an important role as the owner, manager, and regulator of water supply infrastructure, due to 
different implicit needs or characteristics of the sector: large-scale capital investments in 
infrastructure networks, monopolistic control of the ‘natural monopoly’, symbolic and cultural 
importance of water, strategic, political, and territorial relevance, intense conflicts for its shared use, 
health and hygiene effects of the lack of access to water. Again, taxation, now drawn from the 
national level, was able to finance the dramatic expansion of water networks. 
4. Private participation since the 1970s 
Budds & McGranahan (2003) contend that in the global North, the shift from statist to neoliberal 
policies in the late 1970s explains the move back towards private provision of water. Privatising 
utilities thus came to be framed as a necessary response to the purported failings of a hopelessly 
inefficient public sector, including the need for investments to maintain the infrastructure or even 
the need to promote water conservation through market forces (Beesley, 1997; Davis, 2005; 
Johnstone & Wood, 2001; Nickson & Franceys, 2003; World Bank, 1997). Those reconfigurations 
raised opposition that tended to focus on: the particular attachment that people have to this most 
basic resource; concerns over private ownership of what remains a natural monopoly; a sense that 
something so basic as water should not be provided for profit; concerns over the likely 
environmental consequences; and a lack of available evidence that the private sector would do a 
better job of running the service, especially in reducing water poverty (Bakker, 2003; Castro, 2007; 
Hall & Lobina, 2003; Strang, 2004; Swygnedouw, 2004). Neoliberal ideas have had a profound 
influence on international development and policy debates in the water delivery sector (and also 
sewerage and sanitation), especially in the 1990s, with an increasing role for the private-sector in 
the global South as well. Thus, water privatisation became central to the policy prescriptions 
delivered by the International Financial Institutions in the form of Structural Adjustments 
Programmes throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Privatisation, as Karen Bakker (2003) argues, is 
something of a misnomer, as it frequently comprises an overlapping set of strategies from all-out 
divestiture to forms of public-private partnership. Each of these different arrangements imply 
slightly different ownership of water assets as well as differing responsibilities for capital investment, 
the balance of risk and the responsibility for operation and maintenance (for a full discussion, see 
Bakker, 2003 and World Bank, 2006). 
5. Diverging reconfigurations of privatised utitilites: financialisation and remunicipalisation 
In many ways processes of privatisation, alongside the wider systemic rise of finance capital in the 
global economy, laid the ground-work for the geographically variegated logics of financialisation to 
enter forms of private ownership in the sector (March & Purcell, 2014). Notably, this form of 
ownership is distinct from the shareholder model of privatisation. A variety of cities, regions and 
countries witnessed urban water management subject to value extraction strategies by private 
equity funds repackaging and debt-loading water infrastructures as financial investment vehicles. 
However, in a parallel and opposite direction, at the turn of the century localised opposition to 
water privatisation appeared to develop into a global movement, finding its expression in large-scale 
protests against the IFIs and militant local opposition to specific projects such as a contract signed 
for the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia (Olivera & Lewis, 2004). At the same time, expected profit rates 
from water privatisation failed to reach the levels expected, thereby seeming to foreclose the 
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encroaching logics of financialisation. Contracts were either renegotiated to benefit the private 
operator or, in some cases, were cancelled. Given the above, from the early 2000s the global trend 
towards increasing privatisation slowed and by the 2010s had begun to reverse such that 
remunicipalisation now outpaces privatisation (McDonald, 2018). In a nutshell, while privatisation 
now appears to have been outstripped by a process of remunicipalisation, other geographies from 
Chile, to the US and the UK bear witness to the entrance of new private actors, such as equity and 
pension funds, targeting water infrastructure ownership for financial super-profits.    
DOES FINANCIALISATION MEAN SOMETHING VERY DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATISATION? 
To grasp what is different about financialisation it is helpful to return to the example of Thames 
Water (for the best discussion see Allen & Pryke, 2013), the water company supplying the London 
region. It should be borne in mind that the Thames case is an emblematic one. In many respects it 
represents the height of financialisation and not the typical experience. Nevertheless, the extreme 
nature of the Thames case is particularly helpful in exemplifying what is really distinctive about 
financialisation. For the first five years following privatisation the UK government held a “golden 
share” in this newly privatised utility, preventing any dramatic changes in ownership and ensuring 
that Thames Water adhered to the kind of model of shareholder capitalism originally promoted by 
the Thatcher government. By 2001, however, Thames Water was purchased by the German utility 
company RWE. Then, in 2006, the ownership of the company changed even more dramatically when 
Kemble Water Holdings Ltd, a private equity company, purchased the water utility. Thames Water 
thereby became one of four water and sewerage utilities in England and Wales to be owned by a 
private equity company. Led by the Australian Investment Bank, the Macquarie group, Kemble 
Water built on the latter’s significant experience in infrastructure financing and, very quickly, the 
financial model around Thames Water transformed in ways that are now emblematic of 
financialisation. Thus, in 2007, the revenue stream flowing from household bills – a particularly 
stable, inflation protected and regulated revenue stream in the UK context – was repackaged as a 
financial commodity through the process known as securitisation. An opaque corporate structure 
subsequently developed in which company debt could be rais d against future revenue streams and 
in which this debt rapidly outpaced equity in the company finances (in what is known as gearing). 
Borrowing against future returns enabled Kemble Water to ensure high dividend payments to 
existing shareholders. Debt levels meanwhile rose from £3.2 billion to £7.8 billion by 2012 (Bayliss, 
2014; Mazzucato, 2018, p.109). Since privatisation and subsequent take-over by private equity, nine 
water companies (including Thames Water) have seen average debt levels rise by 74 per cent 
between 2003 and 2013, while equity fell by 37 per cent (Bayliss, 2014). On occasion dividend 
payments exceeded profits as Kemble Water appeared to become a particularly effective vehicle for 
maximising returns on the investments of the Macquarie group’s clients. Over the same time, the 
ownership of Kemble Water transformed as Macquarie’s stake was gradually acquired by pension 
funds and sovereign wealth funds. At the time of writing, the sovereign wealth funds of Abu Dhabi, 
China and Kuwait together own a 27 per cent stake in the company; the Ontario Municipal 
Employees’ Retirement Scheme owns a 27 per cent stake; and the Universities Superannuation 
Scheme owns a further 11 per cent stake.   
Clearly, since 2006 something fundamental has changed in the manner in which Thames Water 
operates. The part of the company overseen by the consumer regulator is now relatively 
insignificant in the entity’s overall function. Instead, financial wizardry has become far more 
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significant to the overall health (or ill-health) of the firm and to the production and sale of potable 
water appears far less relevant to the profits realised. Instead, such utilities rely on the securitisation 
of guaranteed revenue streams that can be sold on as financial commodities within a range of 
bundled investment packages. Understanding this process demands an interpretation in which 
value, rent and finance are seen as finely interwoven (see a more extensive forthcoming 
publication). Thus, the super-profits realised by financialised utilities are made possible at least in 
part by the capture of different forms of rent through the monopoly ownership of water 
infrastructure. 
Sidebar title: Rents 
At its most basic level, rent refers to payment for access to a resource such as housing, land or 
patented knowledge. Within the Marxist tradition, rent is understood to be a social relationship 
made possible by processes of dispossession and through the development of a legal system 
establishing property rights. Over time dispossession and property titling come to be naturalised and 
rent appears as a simple relation between things, not a relationship forged through human action. 
Marx’s own analyses of rent focused predominantly on agriculture, exploring the persistence of a 
class of landowners and its influence on profit rates and the circulation of capital into and out of the 
agricultural sector. In so doing, he developed three separate categories of rent: monopoly, absolute 
and differential rent. From the 1970s onwards, scholars began extending Marx’s discussions of 
agricultural rents to urban land and housing markets. More recently, others have further expanded 
the discussion in order to analyse how rents are accrued within emissions trading schemes, 
ownership of infrastructural assets, as well as how surplus profits are rooted in differences in natural 
conditions. In so doing rent-theoretical perspectives have enabled a focus on environmental 
questions and state policies as well as anti-colonial critiques of an emerging production regime 
based on resource extraction. Rent-theoretical perspective matter for financialisation in beginning to 
point to the origin of finance’s super-profits within the reconfiguration of ownership and risk of 
infrastructural assets. 
WHAT IS THE LIKELY INFLUENCE OF FINANCIALISATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS? 
New financial mechanisms have enabled infrastructure to be enrolled within a system of rent 
extraction in ways clearly not envisaged in the early years of water privatisation. Indeed, 
infrastructure has become one of the crucial sites for mopping up over-accumulated capital within 
the global economy over the last two decades (Torrance, 2009). Concurring with Merme et al. (2014) 
we argue that a radical shift in the financing model of water infrastructure must be seen as one of 
the key influences on this shifting model of provision and infrastructure development.  
Pryke & Allen (2017) illustrate several of these shifts through the Carlsbad desalination plant in San 
Diego, California. Through a particularly detailed analysis of the range of financial actors and 
investment packages that gave rise to the desalination plant, they demonstrate “the ability of 
financial intermediaries to extract value from illiquid assets by turning them into liquid forms” (p.2). 
Securitisation, as described above, is a crucial part of the process they describe. Thus, through 
packaging guaranteed revenue streams as a financial commodity, a range of investors are able to 
“extract value” from the plant. Nevertheless, Pryke & Allen (2017) go beyond this process to look at 
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a broader “range of financial techniques that capture value: from the refinancing of debt and the 
reduction of borrowing costs through to the restructuring of bond and equity returns over the 
lifetime of a project. On this view, everything from the evaluation of operational cash flows to value 
searches and their extrapolation, through to the discounting of future value streams, feed into 
expected returns” (p.6). 
Elsewhere, returning to the example of Thames Water, Loftus & March (2016) argue that the 
construction of the UK’s first major desalination plant, the Thames Water Desalination Plant at 
Beckton needs to be viewed in relation to the overall financial model being pursued by the utility. At 
a cost of £270 million many initially viewed the plant as a costly, environmentally destructive, vanity 
project for Thames Water that would simply entrench wasteful water use when investments were 
urgently needed for upgrading a crumbling piped network across the city. Nevertheless, within the 
current regulatory framework the plant can also be viewed as an opportunity to generate new 
revenue streams and expand the terrain over which rents can be captured. While not used to 
provide water to the network since its completion in 2012, the plant has been rebranded as the 
“Most Sustainable Project” in 2009 and “Desalination Plant of the Year” in 2011. An even more overt 
example, the Thames Tideway Tunnel (TTT) is currently undergoing construction at a cost of £4.2 
billion (Loftus & March, 2017). This pharaonic project is ostensibly predicated upon the need to 
upgrade London’s overburdened sewerage network to tackle Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs). 
Requiring a Special Purpose Vehicle to be established that is separate from Thames Water, the TTT 
has opened up one of the most expansive terrains for generating revenue streams within the water 
infrastructure sector in Europe. Already, several years before the tunnel will open, annual household 
bills had increased on average by £13 to fund the tunnel. Thames currently estimates an average 
annual increase of £20-25. The beneficiaries from the new revenue streams opened up are large 
institutional investors. Thus, if financialisation is likely to influence infrastructure projects in the 
future, it will be in reconfiguring them as wealth creation mechanisms and through favouring 
projects – often large-scale ones – that maximize the ability to capture rents.  
Conclusion 
If the development of water infrastructure over the last few centuries needs to be contextualised in 
relation to shifting patterns of ownership and investment, the present moment requires some 
understanding of processes of financialisation. Infrastructure projects in a range of different 
locations are now being led by a new class of financial elites that seems able to transform the 
guaranteed revenue streams emanating from water’s monopolistic status into a range of financial 
products. At no point in the past has water infrastructure been so deeply tied to the fortunes of 
sovereign wealth funds, pension schemes and institutional investors. This tie represents a 
fundamental shift from the transformation of local waters into global money identified by 
Swyngedouw (2004). Instead, the revenue streams emanating from fixed infrastructure assets are 
transformed into financial commodities which guarantee the extraction of rents for states, 
pensioners and financiers around the world. While this may not necessarily always be a negative 
move – indeed for Castree & Christophers (2015) finance can provide a crucial resource for 
sustainable transformations – in many instances financialisation favours a process of accumulation 
by dispossession in which ecologies are produced out of an increasingly risky, heavily leveraged and 
fundamentally undemocratic financial model. As Allen & Pryke (2013) emphasise, this suggests a 
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model geared more towards providing benefits to investors than consumers, and one that 
increasingly loses sight of the needs of citizens. 
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